

Nure

2.05

NUC BOOK

Anti-prolif loop

secret

anti-Corvalan (Corvalan?)
CANDOUR

my contact:

We've ^{US} been willing to ^A accept any
restraint on US devel, (test), production,
spread or use. (or inspection in US?)
i.e. the obvious essential prerequisite
to ^B an inspired restraint on SU / Russia.

Thus, A has always had higher priority
than B, blocking B

approach otherwise (e.g. Burch plan)
is truly a loop.

see rejection of CANDOR; New Look ^{major intel - probab + Korea:}
(compare SU, 1991: ^{Britain's} ^{Down}

Nothing is more recent, determinate, than

see ME and
SU, 1983?

2/ foreign dangers of further esc of
core - by ~~US~~ US, followed by SU

b) opportunities for averting (Hottel)
US-SU esc

c) Internal re-orientation to agree + avert
(see scheme of the Dams in VA - incl Nure,
(Crest, Office, etc.) Kilpatrick Stemmer '56
Johnson '65 (REF)

anti-proof is not only not a high priority: it is
proof is often forwarded, - SECRET (HGB)

d) US acceptance of, knowledge of, and to
proof by others:

French use of text

(Helpful Report)

(lower, saved?!) 10

Israel

(One French male)

Pink

David: Tent

South Africa

unnecessary —
or would this?

Answer:

Vertical cap: paper, heavy

May: 80's

Don - Shah

(Do I want "stunt of ontology" manifest a promise to US? So says Selig Harrison 2-15-05

(A beetle?) (Copied)

(See my leaf & continuous study of Hiroshi
Morioka — vol. S. B.

Which country has improved his relations with US by getting arms?

Next SC: CW was on 4/9 - after Berlin Crisis '48

not OK; (France? not from US)

NOT CHINA; ^(see 69472) Israel; India/Pak (but
Tests (North Korea?)

1964-65

Prospect is dangerous: China (US, SW); Iraq

after Kuwait; how now?

New data:

Delegation

Renettmoens

SU in Cuba

(1980 from crisis - Carter!

✱

Faint strike plans - 1961

fear of leaks/WB

Excluded 45 Particular 45

(3) on danger

Rebulet 44

(Frank) Rebrimble

Clinton?

(6) ^{apparently} on to court - Adrian - Delimetal Plan

(^{vs. H}

Commit, Office 49-50

appie entel

delimetal, " " 52 vs. H treaty

Bund (Biter)

fine
1951: no proposal
for new ~~treaty~~
agreement?

no "Frank Report"?

WHY NOT?

McGarity? (Korea?)

Testing 1956

Tell, RAND

1960-62

" "

(1961 - no proposal for new agreement!)

1961-62: What & could
have told!

(in SU: Sakharov - vs. 58/100 MT

GILPATRIC 1964-65

"MAD" - play of McN vs. USAF: FS cap. (MIRV, ABM)

(see Kist - vs. "channels" / see McN ^{adv.} Barin - Chinese ABM:

VFR in 1961: (Loss)

McA/LBJ vs. new way with China
from late-1964 to 1968

Chinese
(I wanted ~~China~~ help vs. DRV

did all hope - from mid-69 on, to
reverse China stand back from war of
nuas in NVN?!

Chinese

(He didn't propose otherwise
to provoke China (?)

while VCS ^{for} 1964-1968

as in loss 1960-61-62

" 1949-50-51

i) "Superiority can be maintained"

ii) its worth it

iii) its essential - at cost
of our rule + profit

iv) its very profitable for America
(see 1961/Ball!)
like in Korea, to LBJ

and for pole,
in WH, Congress

known in: Polk

(UK?)

SO

(France? Poland? etc.)

(unlike - it turned out -
monopoly (just used
in Berlin - though

it didn't help in Korea
in 1950-51 (did it?)

the thought its end in
Korea, + Quemoy

known used in Indochina
at Hanau and after

(see Warh Post in 1952)

TN Diplomacy (since 1951-52/54)

(see Har)

see FVA e-mail on grants

2-15-04

NUC Book

Book is prepared — with testing + development
+ think —

to give up NPT

to give up ABMT + CTB (already)

to accelerate deployment (+ testing) in China

France

India
(China)

Japan?

South Korea

Russia
(big missiles)
back to MIRV

to forgo inspections (NPT over)

and meanwhile: to give up and to Russian
on control of weapons

to forgo pressure on Pak, on Khan

to ~~refer to~~ ^{to refer to}
to bring NK out of program

or to press forward to give up weapons (deployed)
along with Iran, ME (inspections)

(Pak

Egypt

(Who besides Libya might give up arms?

Saudi? Egypt? (not Pak; or India (China)

Iran? (ban of US) (Iraq?!))

NK BOOK

Selected III multilateral all being: "need" for US FS cap
+ oil + dollars (CME) ^{US} ^{into}

EU threats

Selected I:

Eye I

Date:

retal

SU opponent everywhere

SU-Roth (us negot.)

Human cap.

Barbaric Hap

H. bomb

Missile Hap

Selected IV: Prerequisite for empire: Iran, ME; Berlin;

Axis: "2nd-strike D-2"

[note: VSCF - 2nd: FS

Dominic Theory

minut SU superiority

" " FS cap

divided Germany;

disarmament and disarm

Iranian

Japan

sphere for

Japan, not

China threat

(real threat: strat. point!)

NATO

SU 175 divs (for NATO)

SU threat to West Europe

SU ABM cap

"Need" for US protection of Europe

SS-20

SU creating cap on CTB

(We ignore MRBMs/IRBMs)

FS threat of Cuban missiles

need for Trood (w. SU FS cap.)

(Destabilize instability - to maintain credible threat)

What I was trying to do

PALs

WJ did Karpman → Altman

Press this?

Am Ambros

Press control

no cities

Enthous?

end war

resumes
CS

To put down French?

no Moscow

(French + US ~~DO~~ (in 1961-62)

(no dump)

hard to target cities!

no delegation

NFCU

I wanted Press to control (to get PALs on;

(NATO

in theory, UCS control would suffice for this)

Berlin

OPK wanted US control. Both heard "options"

Highly sensitive implied:

and I wanted to
save China + cities

we could defend Berlin with EU

was without from of what

~~was~~ 1st or 2d strike;

or see

20M KIA so losses will

(presumably not true,

to 600M (+ New Writers:

dispute on imp.!

I would have permitted).

didn't seem to me

see FS planning at the same time!

(VFR-MCG-MCN surely didn't believe it! (?)

(Karpman?

Roskin?

(I told (Wizards) - being heard from Roskin?

I still suspect my concern, my intentions
and my efforts

and note — But I strongly suspect not taking a different ^{WB} path
and take no pride in what I accomplished,
and if anything

opportunities

after Sept '61

for our control

At the time, I thought that was more
than it probably was

(Almost no one knew what I had done ^{at all}
at all; it looked like a lot,
considering who I was (for one zealot
to do — ^{along with} some guys for Kampen,
Trisel, McKenny, Euthorn (earlier, AWW, WSP)

It may have been nothing —

but it may have been less than others

(e.g. Kampen!)

And in some ways it ~~probably~~ ^{may have}
under things were

(FS plans? Kilpatrick → CIL)
still, they were better than SROP! (Pat)

(Thayer if ever had come in 1962 - or later -
I might have saved China, and my cities
(prob. not Moscow!)

NUC Book

Be ~~Not~~

PA + ~~Self~~

(like friends.)

Cathy + Chibungu

US & Kraguland

limits of det (I + II)

Control

"Survival" (self-assertion
behavior)

limits of "noticed" behavior

Delegation

Humility = ~~weak~~ selective cover

mostly weak or zero

Can be manip or provoked

* let negative

toward anal. "silly"

or Respect

Shifting Negatives:

Self Comp Forg ...

has

high bar Non-votes

NVC 800

US air that required FU that

Europe; ME; VN/SVN (China, 1946-49? need for US troops, too?
see Korea 1950-51 (why not used, etc) which required superiority

Threatened? why force MearA? → N 1968-69 (why did Reagan recall Perry?)
Why wait for the 1952 (MearA)-53

Diet (not) China (MearA) Energy
are for news? Possible

{ KS-D-2
{ NO SU PS D-L Super II
no SU PU threat

how US air that precluded

effective air control

(or Min Det: unilateral
limits

and effective non-prolif

(under current conditions

protest - CW

(is "abortion" really still possible?

(Even?)

Limits of det: in Cuba

yet K didn't tell us — so is ^{strengthen}

of weakness or delegation
or lack of control of AA!

Anti-prolif has had the same priority
and focus as anti-drugs

Pretty for same reason:

count USG relations (complicating ais)
with proliferators

drugs: Chivato

Kao-I-Yang Pao

SVN

Afghans/Paks

Contras/Honduras

Noriega

again, Afghans/Paks

Mafia

(see secret deals - torture - with
Syria, now.

US give mission that require credible
FO threats or, possibly, use
(threat worked in Siberia: Kennan
and '50's
and on Berlin

Scary: did SU threat work, or not?

Half War: probably yes. Iraq: not needed -
SH "threat" of CW/BW didn't work; nor did assassins.

Vs. "rat." - calculating consequences
on independent judgment of
options, consequences, pros/cons, values...

(not: given by authority ("social beliefs
or groups
or dictations
or "honor / promise / obligation

Different effects of breaking a promise
or a threat

either may be "suicidal"
if carried out

or

thankful

("The Mackloer") promise should "never" be a bluff
Fidelis:

General honor understood that a threat ("raising in poker")
spartans may be bluff ("honorably" analyze

VII - appeal to Honor ("agreement"
"commitment")

(de Gaulle does conclude from C-II: Turkey
don't depend on US "promise"

or was it US-UK relation: Skybolt/
VER help to French came after that! Polaris
see my feelings about Turk deal!

(I thought "K has to break down -
rationally!"

I was not deterred from conventional attack, f 10 (CB)
OR 32 MRBM / IRBM.

Oct: "suicidal" response to V/humiliation
is always possible.

Type II can never be "perfect"

nor can Type II - e.g. a NWS
is attached conventionally
(see frag in Gulf War)

even if FU/FS is
"suicidal"

(can both sides have some ^{NWSs} Type II - yes (?)
~~may~~ be "provoked" (if conventional attack
or if limited war FU)
into FU, FS or etc

We wanted Type II so strong that
SU could not cred. threaten to respond
to limited FU or its allies or itself

Hesling to Hocke

one can have
this at low levels,
"cheap" - but
M/C doesn't prefer that.

and to defence SU of FU/FS threat
(or of ~~less~~ - then - suicidal retal to
US ~~then~~ FS (no SU D-L:

threat of
instability, loss of
control - ~~medium~~

or, very limited)
make then FS certainly totally suicidal
and does, not
(Hilphotes)

(HAR: What is now? But if we sought it and approved to

2-16-05

HUC BOOK

Strange Love

America's ~~First~~ Fatal Chinese Infatuation with ~~Stephen~~ Beijing
Attraction to Nuclear Weapons
Threats

No American Pres has been willing to take
responsibility for lowering the credibility of
American threats to initiate ~~the~~ nuclear warfare
to propose steps... to press... and to cause delays...
(even those - R' - who have privately
believed that to carry out any such threat
would be at best a totally unacceptable risk.

(see McN, Genshinsky... McN to
my NATO speech (do I have it? See Clark speech.
Efforts to get NATO off it -
see NATO planning...

Am. Amban/Athens...

NFU issue

Henry...

Brookmanlip

Here threats were to: keep NVN north of 17th Parallel
in August 1954 and after

(conventionally: it worked)

(or simply (VCS?) allow us to
attack China -
without holding off SU)

and (VCS) Chinese north of DRV

even if US ---

interested

and get DRV to withdraw NVA... (N) or refrain from
1972 China - or worse

2-16-05

Who came up with name, Dr. Stengeler?

How, why?

How did script evolve?

What's right

As Peter Hege (Bryant?) alive?

Teller book is wrong on HAK + HK

Madness (Amen)

MAD is mad - as is everything else

"Fools, Delirious, Madness of Crowds":

even one so suicidal?

See Whitecraft Trials

forever

Circumstances

(was?)

WWI?

(see court trial

of man who stalled car on tracks)

Tolson showed a little recklessness

but not "madness"

WWI? (2 years later?)

[Was anti-Semite essential to Nazis coming
power? or Hitler's aggressions? (No)]

Russia was his big error (like Napoleon)

Could he have been stopped

Or did Japan "mind" to
attack Pearl?

(by his generals)?

No country has ever had a credible
FC^{or WMD} threat against US, for anything
we've actually done

[Iraq would have, if they'd had WMD's!
SU, China didn't use it

Now (?) need of a 2d-use threat
for a limited US war

But FC is credible against invasion
— or even heavy attacks (Korea War, Iraq)
even though it's suicidal.

(What if we had known (or felt
any inkling — as of WMD's) that Suez
was behind 9-11? as public threats!
as stark threats! ~

We wanted ^{to keep} no threat, and we
UK/Eden wanted an threat in 1928!

Did Comint + allies realize that never were
not joint to deter our attacks OR invasion of
Europe ("100 countries"!)

(Korea & Japan in 1951!)

Two use

July 45 - test real potential of destroying
life

(see S/GP - we winter unknown

Bomb test - 3 x predicted

Mile 2 x predicted

C-II: obligation

AA

Wf not just put
SU troops on Chen,
and oversee it?

We would

40,000 troops

(have obligation)

(We couldn't attack!)

or oversee weapons?

||| (K had promised not to
cause trouble before election!

(too was could not be attacked -

was was to prevent!
stop invasion!

But also - balance! (points)

Turkey - spoke
there?

(We could put as many in
Turkey, or Europe!)

I think us. Japan - not needed, probably

But think us. SU - needed. cost in pop. loss?
who control?

(Stalin calls Khrushchev after Hiro, not I think - no?)

It's now clear to me that

NOC BOOK

2-05

Highly logic

than mere "message"

under-rates & unreliability of protection, or "control"
(of signals, offers, threats)

Nothing guarantees a NWS will not respond to
(what it sees as a provocation) with
a mere attack

(OBC - but see, 84) (CIA)

Nor does conf. of responding with a mere verbal
guarantee that a NWS will not be attacked, either

Thus, FC threats can be credible (enough)
or against a NWS or

"det I" (or II) is not automatically
reliable for a NWS... probab. doesn't
or an ally of a NWS (esp., of SU: "inferior"
to US.

without good prospect "Sup." allows NWS (US) to make
of disarming ^{all-out} attack
FC threats against NWS or its ally.

~~but~~ attacks a superior NWS

not very credible:

with NWS (after it has launched campaign and is dangerous,
FC vs. your ally) is very dangerous:

not can be ordered off "order" to drive the NWS
what is left then the guarantee response will what

2-17-05

Thus, threats of US FCU vs. UVN did
not (I believe) run much risk of
new Madame (or, say, vs. Berlin) from SU
or China.

Kickin' vs. China (all-out).

(But - precedent of FCU

denial of VCS; HAK? N? (probably)
(not '22) "

not, by JFK, LBJ (HAK? in 1965, allegedly
out of office

N, yes: dis, out, in

Complicated? Not that much - for you.

(Pols don't run on strategies like
this: pool, billiards, checkers, poker.

Crazy? Yes! Playing with fire - or nitro
(crushing percussion caps with teeth)

When McN + McB say, "no war at all,
no consideration..."

if we arguing against VCS drive

to carry threats out...

JFK
he pretended
(bluffed) not to be

deterred by risk (=!!) of

SU wars on Berlin + Turkey

he pretended to be
willing to lose / test

FCU threats

if used threats, whether or not

if admitted it to themselves

(see 1961 - including me! it!

and 1962 wrt Berlin, Turkey: ~~if~~

JFK didn't think FCU threats would work! But ~~the~~ did

Mr. Doe

2-13-65

Then US FC plans are are plans
for crimes against humanity
in the eyes of most UN members.

and in most cases, massive war crimes

Probs (+ plans) are a conspiracy to commit
(? at a time + place + under
circumstances uncertain

nevertheless, prob. for mass murder)

World Court: ... unless, perhaps, necessary
to preserve integrity, security,
independence of nations.

(NATO plans, Pak? Israel?

Pakistan? "India"

(2d stage: ^{Det.} criminal for use
or BW/CW attack?

World Court opinion?

But STOP (+ Russian STOP) (What are
French plans?
Israeli?!

see South Africa?
Pak?

(Clarke article)

STOP is a plan for the greatest crime
against humanity in history =

(What of: Doomsday machine — as crime
see Russian Doomsday Machine!

K obligation in C-II?

What of a non-automatic
Doomsday machine?

US lack of PACS, obligation
TRIDENTS, now
about

New Winter System? see York

New Book

2-10-05

49th
Congress

A Chronicle of
Madness -

A Memoir of the
New Era

Government Home
Mod

Notes:

Responding to

Evil

(N)

Chow: Resistance?

to Civil War

Responsibly